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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Bankruptcy-Turnover Order as Res Judicata in Contempt
Proceedings-Limiting the Rule in Oriel v. Russell
In granting the petition for a turnover order by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' held that possession at
the time of adjudication of bankruptcy, or before or after such adjudica-
tion, gave rise to a presumption of continuing possession at the time
of the request for a turnover order.2 In contempt proceedings brought
for failure to obey the turnover order, the bankrupt persistently claimed
inability to comply with the order and claimed that he did not have
possession of the property at the time of issuance of the order. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals,3 admitting the facts indicated that he
was actually unable to comply with the order, nevertheless affirmed
the holding of the district court that the bankrupt be jailed until
he complied. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,4 the
judgment was vacated and it was held that the controlling factor in
the contempt proceedings was the issue of the present ability of the
bankrupt to comply with the turnover order, and that the decision in
Oriel v. Russell 5 did not compel the court to commit the bankrupt for
contempt despite the presence of a belief of inability to comply.
The case of Oriel v. Russell establishes the rule that in contempt
proceedings where the purpose of the proceedings is not to punish the
bankrupt for refusal to obey the order but rather to aid as a part of
the bankruptcy procedure in coercing the bankrupt to produce assets
which have been judicially determined to be in his possession in the
proceedings for the turnover order,6 the decision of the court in issuing
the turnover order is res judicata and cannot be attacked collaterally.
7
Reaffirming this holding, the majority of the court in the instant case
says, "But application of that rule in these civil contempt cases means
only that the bankrupt, confronted by the order establishing prior pos-
session, at a time when continuance thereof is the reasonable inference,
is thereby confronted by a prima facie case which he can successfully
1 Zeitz v. Maggio, 145 F. 2d 241 (C.C.A. 2d 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 841
(1945).
' The second circuit applies this -presumption with almost conclusive effect.
Cohen v. Jeskowitz, 144 F. 2d 39 (C.C.A. 2d 1944) ; Robbins v. Gottbetter, 134
F. 2d 843 (C.C.A. 2d 1943); Seligson v. Goldsmith, 128 F. 2d 977 (C.C.A. 2d
1942).
5In re Luma Camera Service, Inc., 157 F. 2d 951 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
'Maggio v. Zeitz, 68 Sup. Ct. 401 (1948).
r278 U.S. 358 (1929).
052 STAr. 843 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §11(a) (13) (1940) ; 52 STAT. 859-860 (1938),
11 U.S.C. §69 (1940) ; In re MacNaught, 225 Fed. 511 (Mass. 1903) (the power
to commit is used to compel obedience, not punish for disobedience).
Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929) ; cf. In re Free and Flinck, Inc., 18 F.
Supp. 802 (E.D. N.Y. 1937) (newly discovered evidence). Contra: In re Elias, 240
Fed. 448 (E.D. N.C. 1917) (Many cases before the decision in Oriel v. Russell held
that evidence of happenings before or after the issuance of the turnover order
could be considered in the contempt proceedings.).
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meet only with a showing of present inability to comply. He cannot
challenge the previous adjudication of possession, but that does not pre-
vent him from establishing lack of present possession." 8 Any evidence
that the bankrupt may give which satisfies the court that he does not
presently have possession of the property, and cannot comply with the
order, is sufficient.9
It must be kept in mind that this is a civil contempt' 0 which is not
for the purpose of punishment for concealment of assets but rather
for use in coercing the bankrupt to turn over assets when it appears
that no other sanction is accomplishing this. It can hardly be denied
that the conclusion of the court in the instant case is just and proper
because if it is proven to the court's satisfaction that the bankrupt does
not have possession of the goods, there can be no purpose in imprison-
ment to coerce him into giving up that which he does not have. The
dissent, affirming the decision of the circuit court of appeals, would in
effect commit the bankrupt fruitlessly as the court must release him im-
mediately since it already is satisfied that he cannot comply with the
order.
There are two important considerations the court must note in laying
down the law applicable to this contempt proceeding. First, there is
the desire to aid the trustee in his administration of the bankrupt estate
and to prevent the bankrupt from escaping his duties under the law
because of a weak weapon in the hands of that law. 11 Second, there is
the feeling that the bankrupt should not be imprisoned unless the
court is reasonably certain that in so doing its purpose will be effected-
to put him into jail otherwise would be punishment for debt rather than
an instrument of coercion.' 2 The bankruptcy act provides specifically
for an action by the trustee against the bankrupt for fraudulent con-
' Maggio v. Zeitz, 68 Sup. Ct. 401, 411 (1948).
'Toplitz v. Walser, 27 F. 2d 196 (C.C.A. 3d 1928) (bankrupt sufficiently
answers the inquiry as to the property previously adjudged in his possession hming
passed out of his control by convincing the court that he is physically unable to
obey the order). See Kreitman, The Presumption of Continued or Present Pos-
session in Turnover Proceedings, A3 CoRn. REORG. AND Am. BANKR. RE . 326
(1940).
"'ee Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911).
".See Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 363 (1929) (the contempt proceedings
are intended to compel, against the reluctance of the bankrupt, performance by
him of his lawful duty). In California the trustee in bankruptcy may obtaifn a
money judgment in the state court against the bankrupt in case the contempt
proceedings are unavailing because of absence of proof by the trustee of his
ability to comply with the order. Sampsell v. Gittelman, 55 Cal. App. 2d 292,
130 P. 2d 486 (1942), A5 Corn,. REORG. AND Am. BANxR. Ray. 35.
" In re Heppellee, 2 F. Supp. 663 (Mass. 1932) (contempt is not a substitute
for imprisonment for debt) ; In re MacNaught, 225 Fed. 511 (Mass. 1903). It
is now settled that punishment for contempt for disobedience of the turnover order
is not imprisonment for debt since the bankrupt does not owe the property but
rather is obliged to turn over that which has been placed in the custody of the
trustee in bankruptcy for distribution to the creditors pursuant to the provisions of
the bankruptcy law. 5 REmixoN, BANKRUPTCY §2410 (4th ed. 1936).
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cealment of assets'3 and this civil contempt must not be confused
with that nor used in its place. But between the two considerations
there must be some rule of law which will in some measure effect both.
The generally accepted rule of evidence in contempt proceedings
for disobedience of the turnover order is the same as is necessary for
the issuance of the order itself, namely; that it be "clear and convinc-
ing"'14 that the bankrupt can comply with the turnover order. Then,
if he refuses to do so, he may be put into prison until such time as the
court is satisfied that he is not able to comply.' 5 The length of time
he will be kept in prison will depend on the amount and type of proper-
ty involved, the surrounding circumstances, and the discretion of the
court. But this discretion as to the length of imprisonment must not be
abused and the-imprisonment must be no longer than necessary for the
court to satisfy itself that the bankrupt cannot comply with the order.' 6
In holding that the evidence for commitment for contempt must be
beyond a reasonable doubt,17 the concurring opinion is concerned solely
with the desire to keep from committing the bankrupt to imprisonment
unless the court is positive that he is able to comply with the order.
This, of course, in requiring a different rule of evidence for commit-
ment for contempt from that necessary to the issuance of the turnover
order, rebuts any notion that the turnover order cannot be attacked
collaterally in the contempt proceedings' 8 and can only result in dis-
sipating the bankruptcy law because under this rule the bankrupt can,
by injecting any element of doubt in the mind of the court, escape
the coercive arm of the law. It is true that imprisonment is a heavy
weapon, but when all else has failed, it is one that must be resorted to
in order that the bankrupt not be allowed to escape from his moral and
1352 STAT. 855-856 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §52(b) (1940).
14 "With reference to the character or degree of proof in establishing a civil
fraud, the authorities are quite clear that it need not be beyond a reasonable
doubt, because it is a civil proceeding. . . . We think it would be going too far
to adopt the severer rule of criminal cases and would render the bankruptcy
system less effective." Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 364, 365 (1929).
"In re Roxy Liquor Corp., 107 F. 2d 533 (C.C.A. 7th 1939) (the bankrupt
has the legal power to end his confinement by turning over the property and the
assumption is he would do this if able rather than endure a prolonged confinement).
" "Where it [commitment] has failed, and when a reasonable interval of
time has supplied the previous defects in the evidence, and has made sufficiently
certain what was doubtful before, namely the bankrupt's inability to obey the
order, he has always been released, . Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 366
(1929).
" Before Oriel v. Russell, there was a split in authority as to whether the
proof had to be beyond a reasonable doubt or a mere preponderance. In re Elias,
240 Fed. 448 (E.D. N.C. 1917) (a mere preponderance); Stuart v. Reynolds,
204 Fed. 709 (C.C.A. 5th 1913) (beyond a reasonable doubt) ; In re Adler, 170
Fed. 634 (E.D. Okla. 1908) (beyond a reasonable doubt); Moody v. Cole, 148
Fed. 295 (Me. 1906) (beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Switzer, 140 Fed. 976
(S.C. 1905) (beyond a reasonable doubt) ; See In re Felson, 124 Fed. 288, 289
(N.D. N.Y. 1903) (a mere preponderance). See also 5 RzmrNoGroN, BANKRUPTCY
§2411 (4th ed. 1936)." But see Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 362 (1929).
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legal duty, that of providing his assets for the satisfaction of creditors. 19
He is given the advantage of being able to start life anew once the
bankruptcy proceedings are completed, and is only fair that he submit
to the powers of the court which only wants him to do his part.
The dissent would have the evidence confined in all cases to the
showing of events since the turnover order making it impossible for
the bankrupt to comply,20 and would make it incumbent upon the bank-
rupt to produce this evidence or else be adjudged in contempt without
regard to any other factors. If this be so, then we have the very situa-
tion as in the instant case where the court admits the inability to comply
with a turnover order issued by it, and yet because of precedent from
which the court cannot extricate itself,21 it commits the bankrupt for
contempt. Holding that the bankrupt, in order to escape imprisonment
for contempt, must show something happening since the issuance of
the turnover order 22 puts him into a difficult position, to say the least.
The issues in both the petition for the turnover order and the con-
tempt proceedings are present possession of the property, but possession
as of different dates. The issuance of the turnover order determines
the property to be in the possession of the bankrupt on the date of the
order, but the court must be convinced that the bankrupt still has the
property or its proceeds in his custody at the time of the contempt pro-
ceedings before it can properly commit him to jail for disobedience of
the order. As for the evidence necessary on the part of the bankrupt to
prove nonpossession at the time of the contempt proceedings, the court
says in the instant case: "Of course we do not attempt to lay down a
comprehensive or detailed set of rules on this subject. They will have
to be formulated as specific and concrete cases present different aspects
of the problem." 28
The Supreme Court in the instant case neither discards the rule of
the Oriel case as it pertains to the res judicata24 effect of the turnover
order nor reverts to the holdings of many cases before Oriel v. Rus-
5 RxmiNGroN, BANKRUPrCY §2410 (4th ed. 1936)."0Justice Frankfurter delivered the dissent.
" The second circuit has six circuit judges who never -sit en banc and pre-
sumably deem it undesirable for the majority of one panel to have a different
view from that of another panel.
" In re Kasimov, 81 F. 2d 531 (C.C.A. 6th 1936); Sarkes v. Wells, 37 F.
2d 339 (C.C.A. 6th 1930); In re Siegler, 31 F. 2d .972 (C.C.A. 2d 1929). See
Kreitman, The Presumption of Continued or Present Possession in Turwver Pro-
ceedings, .A3 CoRP. REORG. AND Am. BANmi. Rnv. 325, 326 (1940). See also
McGovern, Aspects of the Turnover Proceedings in Bankruptcy, 9 FoRD. L. RFv.
316 (1940).
"3Maggio v. Zeitz, 68 Sup. Ct. 401, 411 (1948).
2 For application of the doctrine of res judicata there must be (1) identity
of the thing, (2) identity of the cause, 'and (3) identity of the parties in the
character in which they are litigant. W. A. and G. Packet Co. v. Sickels, 65
U. S. 242 (1860).
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sell2 5 to the effect that the issuance of the turnover order has no proba-
tive value in the contempt proceedings. But it is held that the turn-
over order, once established by the trustee in bankruptcy, puts the
burden upon the bankrupt to prove to the satisfaction of the court that
he is physically unable to comply with that order.26 He cannot at-
tack the validity of the turnover order, but he can meet the burden
imposed upon him by the issuance of that order with evidence showing
that he is not now in possession of the property and thus incapable of
complying. The bankrupt is not bound to the showing of happenings
since the issuance of the order making him unable to comply, in order to
escape imprisonment, unless the court issuing the turnover order fol-
lowed the rule of the Oriel case that the evidence should be "dear and
convincing" 27 before the order can issue, and in the majority of cases
the courts will have adhered to that rule. However, when the order
upon its face indicates that the court did not issue it upon "clear and
convincing" evidence, but rather because of an inflexible rule of law
which they feel constrained to follow because of precedent,28 the Su-
preme Court cannot justifiably continue the unreasonable presumption
that the bankrupt has in his possession the goods and can comply
with the order when such is obviously not the fact. This was not the
intent of the Oriel case but would be rather a perversion of the rule
there established, which rule must be applied by the court only when
the circumstances warrant.2 9
DANIEL D. RancwrN.
Discovery-Inspection of Chattels
In a recent case,1 the plaintiff sued a bottling company for damages
for an illness allegedly resulting from the consumption of part of a
bottled drink containing a deleterious substance. Before trial, the
defendant requested that the plaintiff allow it to have a chemical analysis
made of the remaining contents of the bottle. Plaintiff refused, and
the defendant moved that he be required to deposit the bottle with the
clerk of court so as to permit an analysis to be made. The trial court
denied the motion. In affirming, the South Carolifia Supreme Court
held: There is no statutory authorization for requiring a party to pro-
20 In re Elias, 240 Fed. 448 (E.D. N.C. 1917). 5 REmINGTO , BANKRVFT
§2428 (4th ed. 1936).
, Power v. Fuhrman, 220 Fed. 787 (C.C.A. 9th 1915).
, See note 14 supra.
'" Other circuits limit the presumption of continued possession according to
circumstances. Brune v. Fraidin, 149 F. 2d 325 (C.C.A. 4th 1945), 31 VA. L.
REv. 938, affirming 55 F. Supp. 129 (D.C. Md. 1944), 31 VA. L. REv. 204.
s In 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 789 (1947) the decision of the circuit court of appeals
in committing the bankrupt for contempt is strongly condemned.
'Welsh v. Gibbons, 211 S. C. 516, 46 S.E. 2d 147 (1948).
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